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State Ownership in Terms of Transition: 
Curse or Blessing
Roza Nurgozhayeva†
This Article argues that the institutional framework within transition 
economies, including the lack of a liquid capital market and a competitive 
product market, in addition to the focus on public benefits and socio-
economic development, favors state-owned companies in terms of a non-
market-based system notwithstanding the popular concept of transaction 
costs and corporate efficiency.  Despite the apparent costs of state ownership, 
including political considerations, soft budget constraints, and weak profit
motivations, there is a rational choice for state ownership in cases when 
private firms are not able to deliver the same quality of goods at a lower cost. 
Therefore, this Article offers another insight into questions of corporate 
efficiency and alternative governance models of state ownership in 
transitional economies based on the example of Kazakhstan.  It attempts to 
determine whether the models of state ownership existing in transition 
economies diminish institutional shortcomings and have important 
implications for capital costs.
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Introduction
Government-owned organizations exist throughout the world including 
in the United States.  Typically, these are larger companies that tend to 
produce a “strategically important product”1 or provide public services such 
† LL.M., J.S.D., Cornell Law School General Counsel, Nazarbayev University.
I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my J.S.D. committee chair, 
Professor Charles K. Whitehead, for being a tremendous mentor, for encouraging my 
research, and for allowing me to grow as a research scientist.  I would like to thank all the 
participants of the Symposium “The Rule of Law in Central Asia” at Cornell Law School 
for their valuable comments and questions, and especially the Advisor to Nazarbayev 
University’s President, Dr. Dennis de Tray. I also want to express my gratitude to the 
leadership of Nazarbayev University and the Cornell International Law Journal for 
organizing the Symposium.  The opinions expressed in this Article are the author’s own 
and do not reflect the view of Nazarbayev University or Cornell Law School.
1. Robert Cull & Lixin Colin Xu, Who Gets Credit? The Behavior of Bureaucrats
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as telecommunication, transportation, water or electricity supply.  Regardless 
of the corporate forms and goals of state entities, the issues of their 
accountability, legitimacy, corporate governance, and incentive structures 
have all been subject to academic discussion.  These debates typically focus 
on the justification of state intervention in the economy, the correlation 
between state ownership and sound financial institutions, and the role of state-
owned entities in a country’s economic development.2 The majority of 
studies touch upon concerns regarding the productive efficiency of state-
owned enterprises, their political and agency costs, and the entire effect of 
state ownership on firm performance.3  The literature often distinguishes 
state-owned companies from privately owned firms, and vice versa, largely 
based on a percentage of shares held either by private or state actors.4
Accordingly, all the deficiencies of state-owned companies are explained
from an ownership perspective or the distinction between state (public) and 
private.5 The latter has been considered a key element of the market economy 
and, consequently, transitional reforms have focused on the increase of the 
and State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, 71 J. DEV.
ECON. 533, 545 (2003).
2. James R. Barth et al., Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do Regulation and 
Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT 
WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T 31, 55 (Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001); Cull & Xu, supra
note 1, at 533–34; Kathryn L. Dewenter & Paul H. Malatesta, State-Owned and Privately 
Owned Firms: An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage and Labor Intensity, 91(1) 
AM. ECON. REV. 320, 320 (2001); Serdar Dinç, Politicians and Banks: Political Influence 
on Government-Owned Banks in Emerging Markets, 77 J. FINAN. ECON. 453, 454 (2005); 
Luke Haggarty & Mary M. Shirley, A New Data Base on State-Owned Enterprises, 11 
WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 491, 492, 497 (1997); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When 
the Government is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1348 (2011); Ross 
Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 688, 705 (1997); Juliet Roper & Michele Schoenberger-Orgad, State-Owned 
Enterprises: Issues of Accountability and Legitimacy, 25 MANAGEMENT COMM. Q. 693, 
699 (2011); Marcia Millon-Cornett et al., The Impact of State Ownership on Performance 
Differences in Privately-Owned Versus State-Owned Banks: An International 
Comparison, 19 J. FINAN. INTERMEDIATION 74, 75 (2010); Enrico Perotti, State 
Ownership: A Residual Role? 3, 5, 8 (World Bank. Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 3407, 
2004); Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Alejandro Micco & Ugo Panizza, Should the Government 
be in the Banking Business? The Role of State-Owned and Development Banks 3, 10, 16 
(Inter-American Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 571, 2004).
3. Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265, 267 
(2002); James R. Barth et al., Financial Regulation and Performance: Cross-Country 
Evidence 16, 19, 20 (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 118, 2001), http://
citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.541.9003&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LPT-CKQ9]; Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Industry Growth and 
Capital Allocation: Does Having a Market-or Bank-Based System Matter? 10 (NBER, 
Working Paper No. 8982, 2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9082 [https://perma.cc/
R6GF-Z29N]; Gerard Caprio & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Avoiding Disaster: 
Policies to Reduce the Risk of Banking Crisis 25 (Egyptian Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working 
Paper No. 47, 2000) (pointing out that government ownership is associated with lower 
economic growth and a lower level of financial development, as well as a higher likelihood 
of financial crises).
4. Przemyslaw Kowalski et al., State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy 
Implications 19–20 (OECD Trade Pol’y Papers, Working Paper No.147, 2013).
5. Millon-Cornett et al., supra note 2, at 77–78.
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private sector’s share and its autonomy from the state.6  This notion has 
significantly shaped the analysis of transition economies, where state 
ownership has been traditionally associated with poor economic 
performance.7 Precisely, questioning the efficiency of state-owned 
enterprises, the literature often emphasizes their lower profit compared to 
their private counterparts.
However, although scholars agree that the central process in terms of 
transition is the building of complete markets and liberal institutions,8 which 
have a strong positive impact on firm performance, there is often a legitimate 
reason why particular companies are state-owned rather than owned and 
operated in the private sector. Within the standard framing, successful 
application of corporate governance best practices requires an efficient 
financial market, where stocks are liquid and corporate conduct is 
transparent.9 In this situation, the market for corporate control is a check on 
the firm’s behavior.  In transition economies, however, where just a small 
portion of the entire market’s shares is publicly traded, the stock price bears 
little relationship to a company’s underlying value, performance, or 
governance.10 Weak contract enforcement, poor protection of property rights, 
and underdeveloped capital markets have resulted in state control of many 
large and often strategic firms, which in turn significantly affects 
accountability structures, investment policies, as well as the strengths and 
weaknesses of state-owned companies.  Therefore, any discussion of
corporate governance in transition economies must consider the implications 
of different state ownership structures and policy agendas including the 
creation of competitive production capabilities, industrialization, economic 
diversification, and social security.
6. Berger et al., Corporate Governance and Bank Performance: A Joint Analysis of 
Static, Selection, and Dynamic Effects of Domestic, Foreign, and State Ownership, 29 J.
BANKING & FIN. 2179, 2180 (2005).
7. Analyzing the role of governments in China, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, 
scholars almost always find its unfavorable effect.  See id. at 2210.
8. Seung Ho Park et al., Market Liberalization and Firm Performance During 
China’s Economic Transition, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 127, 128 (2006) (“Broadly defined, 
market liberalization includes all forms of government initiatives to break the state 
monopoly in the market, free price controls, reduce entry barriers, and privatize state-
owned enterprises (SOEs).  Many emerging and low-income countries commonly use 
market liberalization as a strategy to promote economic development . . . .”).
9. An existing “marketplace” has been assumed to provide the owners of private 
firms with stronger incentives to manage their companies efficiently as opposed to state-
owned enterprises.  See Stephen P. King, Corporatisation and the Behaviour of 
Government Owned Corporations, in FROM BUREAUCRACY TO BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES 43, 45
(Michael J. Whincop ed., 2003) [hereinafter Corporatisation].
10. If the securities market is thin and the workers and managers have strong 
attachments to their employing firms, market signals of corporate valuation would be 
garbled and full of noise.  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES:
INSIDER CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF BANKS, at xiv (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 
1995) [hereinafter Aoki & Kim] (“Further, exercising corporate control through the market 
(the takeover mechanism) would simply not be feasible unless insiders gave up their 
shares.”).
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This Article argues that the institutional framework within transition 
economies favors state-owned companies in terms of a non-market-based 
system notwithstanding the popular concept of transaction costs and 
corporate efficiency.11 Despite the apparent costs of state ownership—
including political considerations, soft budget constraints, and weak profit 
motivation—there might still be a rational choice for state ownership in cases 
when private firms are not able to deliver the same, or even superior, quality 
of goods at a lower cost.12
This Article attempts to provide an alternative approach to understanding 
corporate governance and the efficiency of state-owned companies by 
studying the example of Kazakhstan.  The Kazakhstani experience 
demonstrates that corporate governance is largely affected by a country’s
current institutional environment and economic development existing in the 
country.  Due to the lack of sufficient capital markets and formal governance 
mechanisms, state-owned companies in Kazakhstan perform an active role in 
capitalizing the national economy and sustaining economic growth.13 The 
government’s policy agendas, in turn, shape and expand a set of benchmarks 
for assessing the corporate efficiency of state-owned companies by including
tax revenues, employment, and other socio-economic goods granted to the 
private sector and the population.  Therefore, one may assess the performance 
of state-owned enterprises not only from the perspective of their revenue, but 
also from the amount of social benefits these companies produce.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides the 
conceptual framework of corporate governance and corporate efficiency and 
describes the summary of my theoretical claims.  Part II offers some ideas 
about the existing institutional environment in Kazakhstan.  Part III proceeds 
with a review of the strengths, weaknesses, and tradeoffs of state ownership 
in terms of economic transition.  Finally, the Article concludes with suggested 
policy measures that would improve the performance of state-owned 
companies.
11. Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to 
Acquire Them, 35 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 3, 10 (2000) (“The institutional basis for a 
market economy is not uniquely determined. Formally, there is no single mapping 
between the market and the set of non market institutions required to sustain it.”).
12. See Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133,
138–39 (1998).
13. Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt raise the following question: “[H]ow is a 
system without a plethora of formal institutions deemed important to Western firms 
producing a rapidly expanding list of Fortune 500 companies and supporting high and 
sustained levels of economic development in China?” And then, as one of their hypotheses 
they suggest: 
[I]t is therefore quite possible that China’s formal legal institutions may ‘improve’
in ways that reinforce the current system of industrial organization rather than 
prompt a transition to different forms of corporate organization.  State capitalism 
may prove to be a durable institutional arrangement as a result of interest group 
politics, public policy, and path dependence.  
See Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding 
the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 752 (2013).
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I. What is Missing in the Traditional Theory?
In state-based systems, governments possess strategic economic 
resources and distribute them in accordance with their socio-economic and 
political agendas.14 To fulfill their goals, governments use state-owned 
vehicles including sovereign wealth funds, state shareholding companies, 
state banks, and development institutions.15  Although there are substantial 
discussions on transition economies that include many worthy insights into 
corporate governance in state-owned companies, the analysis is usually based 
on a static and unilateral approach. The literature generally omits the modern 
dynamics of state ownership structures and governance in terms of acting and 
changing institutional conditions of transitional countries, and creates a 
misleading notion about the real effect of state shareholding.16 Therefore, the 
question is: what is missing in the traditional theory?
Economists widely believe that poor-quality institutions impede a 
country’s economic development.  Accordingly, the International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”) and the World Bank have started to impose many governance-
related covenants, which require borrowing countries to adopt “better”
institutions.17 Typically, these “better” institutions are found in Anglo-
American systems.18 Anglo-American systems are generally based on a 
liberal market approach grounded in the strong protection of property rights, 
a liquid stock market, a shareholder-oriented corporate governance structure, 
and a flexible labor market.19 These institutions are considered helpful in 
promoting investments and sustained economic growth.20
14. See Shleifer, supra note 12, at 142.
15. Artur Grigoran, The Ruling Bargain: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Elite-Dominated 
Societies, 17 ECON. GOVERNANCE 165, 166 (2016).
16. The generally known concept called the Washington Consensus requires 
transition economies, such as Kazakhstan and China, for a strong orientation toward a 
market-based economy.  It focuses on minimizing the government involvement since a 
country’s economic growth can be ensured only by free and open markets.  Those markets 
considered to be achieved through full privatization and opening-up the domestic economy 
for trade and investments.  In this regard, transitional countries have been strongly 
encouraged to adopt institutions that call for deregulation and significant privatization.  
Further, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international 
organizations have evaluated corporate governance in transition economies from the 
perspective of their formal compliance with the best standards with little attention to 
whether these arrangements would effectively operate and carry out their anticipated 
functions in terms of transition.  See Lázló Árva & András Schlett, The Long March: The 
Lessons of China’s Economic Transition, 11 ASIA-EUR. J. 39, 43–44, 50 (2013); Erik 
Berglöf & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: 
Implications for Transition and Developing Countries 21, 26 (Annual World Bank Conf. 
on Dev. Econ., Conference Paper, June 1999), https://ssrn.com/abstract=183708 [https://
perma.cc/3DS4-GBUQ]. But see Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 13, at 750–51.
17. Ha-Joon Chang, Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and 
History, 7 J. INT’L ECON. 473, 473 (2011).
18. Id. at 474.
19. See id.
20. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON.
LIT. 285, 302, 322–23 (2008); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate 
Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 1147 (2002). The correlation between law and market 
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Transitional countries have thus been strongly encouraged to adopt 
institutions that call for deregulation, significant privatization, and capital 
market liquidity.  The IMF, the World Bank, and other international 
organizations have evaluated corporate governance in transition economies 
from the perspective of their formal compliance with best standards with little 
attention to whether these arrangements would operate effectively and carry 
out their anticipated functions in terms of transition.21 The main obstacle with 
the application of such best standards to transition economies is the lack of a 
liquid capital market, an efficient market for corporate control, or a 
transparent labor market.  The Kazakhstani example shows that state equity-
holding can, and in fact does, create market systems, but that they are largely 
based on state, not private, ownership.22  These market structures do not 
necessarily lead to weak protection and discrimination of private property 
rights.23 For instance, state-owned enterprises can benefit and enhance 
private initiatives through state investments, subsidies, and informational 
support.  In Kazakhstan, the government and state-owned enterprises have 
been the key actors substantially responsible for industrial upgrading.24
development has been discussed in the literature, especially after La Porta et al.’s research.  
In general, these debates have the “law matters” focus.  Id. at 1166 (cash flow ownership 
contingent on a country’s legal system).  La Porta et al. claim that law is the key 
precondition for market development.  In other words, deep markets cannot be in place 
unless fundamental legal reforms are implemented.  Therefore, common law countries 
perform better because their legal systems protect contract and property rights more 
effectively.  However, a group of scholars offers the opposite hypothesis that market 
development precedes legal reforms (a so-called “crash-then-law” thesis).  John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 19–20, 65–66 (2001).
21. See, e.g., László Árva & András Schlett, The Long March: The Lessons of China’s
Economic Transition, 11 ASIA-EUR. J. 39, 43 (2013) (Hung.).
22. See, e.g., Junmin Wang, State-Building As Market-Building in China, 47 EUR. J.
SOC. 209, 209–40 (2006).  The findings from an examination of the tobacco-market 
dynamics during China’s economic reform era suggest that market-building in transitional 
economies does not necessarily require or entail the decline of the state’s role in market 
activities as in the “shock therapy” approach.  Id.
23. For example, the Singaporean state is well known as a strong state that protects 
private property rights very well.  
However, the very strength of the Singaporean state that enables it to offer such 
protection is founded upon a very high degree of state ownership.  First, the 
Singaporean state’s strength owes a great deal to its strong fiscal position thanks to 
highly efficient SOEs, which collectively produce over 20[%] of the country’s
GDP.  Second, an important basis for the Singaporean state’s high political 
legitimacy is its ability to supply high-quality affordable housing, which in turn is 
possible because it owns all the land in the country and operates a giant public 
housing corporation that supplies 85[%] of the country’s housing.  In other words, 
a high degree of state ownership may in some cases be exactly what enables the 
country to offer strong protection of private property rights. 
Ha-Joon Chang, Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and History, 7 
J. INT’L ECON. 473, 480–81 (2011).
24. In Kazakhstan, as the result of state strategies of industrialization GDP rose to 
27.3 trillion tenge (over US $180 billion) in 2011, which was 107.5% more than in 2010.  
More importantly, the GDP growth in 2011 was achieved thanks to sustainable expansion 
of the manufacturing and the services sector.  The growth of industrial production reached 
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 31 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 31 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
NURGOZHAYEVA FORMATTED (4-10-17) 7/5/2017 3:26 PM
2017 State Ownership in Terms of Transition 53
State-owned enterprises have been able to provide long-term investments that 
are crucial for economic diversification and the creation of capital and 
infrastructural conditions that will further increase private activities—the so-
called “crowding in” effect.25
In any given stage of development, the choice is not necessarily between 
fully privatized or fully state-owned enterprises.26 Instead, the question is 
whether there are the ways to make the existing resource allocation structure 
less costly and more efficient, rather than whether state-owned enterprises 
perform well enough or whether private interests should replace state 
ownership.  Institutional arrangements existing in transition economies have 
determined the concept of efficiency applied to state-owned enterprises.27
Although economists hold varying opinions of what defines corporate 
efficiency, all of the theories are grounded in the fundamental idea of value 
maximization.  In general, the majority of studies have treated corporate 
efficiency as tied to the allocation of resources by rational actors, who make 
their decisions based on market signals.28  From this perspective, private 
companies are considered to perform better than state-owned enterprises and 
3.8%.  In general, 237 start-ups with the total amount of 1 trillion tenge (almost US $6.7 
billion) were initiated in 2011, which allowed the creation of twenty thousand new jobs.  
Summing up, the overall effect of the industrialization program in 2011 was 2% of GDP, 
which could be a solid evidence of the efficiency of state asset management.  See SAMRUK-
KAZYNA, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2011 (2011) (Kaz.), http://sk.kz/en/about-fund/otchety-i-
plany/?temp=full&iblock=51&id=210 (report accessible for download) [https://
perma.cc/Y466-5CHZ].
25. See Ha-Joon Chang, State-Owned Enterprise Reform, U.N. Dep’t for Econ. & 
Social Affairs (UNDESA), National Development Strategies Policy Notes, at 6–7 (2007) 
(“Over the last two decades, there has been a tendency to presume that all public 
investment “crowds out” private investment. However, “crowding out” becomes a 
significant possibility only when the economy is near full employment. In most countries 
with underutilized resources or increased resources obtained through aid, we can expect 
public investment to “crowd in” private investment.  Public investment can further 
enhance economic development, especially if they are made in areas that complement 
private sector investment (e.g., road facilities for major export crop region, investment in 
the training of engineers for a newly-expanding industry, investment in the basic inputs 
industries that are too risky for the private sector.”).
26. Id. at 17.
27. In order to be efficient any corporate structure should provide its constituencies 
with right incentives to run the firm from the perspectives of long-term interests of all 
groups with a stake in the firm.  For example, to improve its corporate governance a 
company may hire high quality auditors or have independent directors. Such steps help 
corporate insiders to demonstrate their intention to commit and hence make it possible to 
raise more capital externally.  However, despite the effort to improve governance in a 
company, it still heavily depends on the country of its residence.  Such factors as weak 
contract enforcement and insufficient protection of property rights can sharply increase 
transaction and agency costs.  Thus, a country image, the overall level of its financial 
development as well as the existing system of political and legal institutions might 
considerably impact corporate governance practice and the costs of capital.  See Rene M. 
Stulz, Financial Globalization, Corporate Governance, and Eastern Europe (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11912, 2006).
28. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, J. FIN. ECON. 305, 328 (1976); Luigi 
Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 15 J. FIN. 1623, 1630 (2000). See generally 
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1416–48 (1989).
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therefore are more efficient.29  Nevertheless, the question of whether state-
owned enterprises are less efficient than private companies remains largely 
unsolved in the literature.30 For instance, private firms, as well as state-owned 
enterprises, suffer from agency problems and high monitoring costs.31 In fact, 
in the case of liberal, liquid, and competitive markets, both private and state 
managers act in the same market conditions and have similar incentives; 
consequently, the gap in performance between private firms and state-owned 
enterprises should be less obvious.32
Under the traditional shareholder-oriented model,33 state-owned 
enterprises may actually conform to the idea of profit maximization.  The 
government can be, and actually is, interested in the state-owned enterprises’
avoiding financial losses.  If incurred, these losses would force the state 
authorities to shrink the financing of state social programs and policies of 
development.34  Additionally, since the large state-owned enterprises are 
usually major taxpayers, the government has a strong motivation to pursue 
positive return from state-owned enterprise operations because poor 
performance of these large, state-owned enterprises as monopolies in their 
industries can hurt the economy as a whole and decrease state revenues.  The 
effects of poor performance from large state-owned enterprises can in turn 
reduce the rate of economic growth, and decrease the government’s
29. Maxim Boycko et al., A Theory of Privatisation, 106 ECON. J. 309, 309 (1996); 
Robert Cull & Lixin C. Xu, Bureaucrats, State Banks and the Efficiency of Credit 
Allocation: The Experience of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, 28 J. COMP. ECON. 1, 23 
(2000); Dewenter & Malatesta, supra note 2, at 332; Millon-Cornett et al., supra note 2, 
at 92; Frederic Mishkin, Is Financial Globalization Beneficial?, 39 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANK. 259, 269 (2007); Juliet Roper Schoenberger-Orgad, supra note 2, at 704; Shleifer, 
supra note 12, at 146; Perotti, supra note 2, at 8, 19; Mary M. Shirley & Patrick Walsh, 
Public Versus Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate 10 (WBG Pol’y Res., 
Working Paper No. 2420, 2000) (concerning whether private companies perform better 
than SOEs and are more efficient).
30. Although many empirical studies have found that government ownership is 
negatively associated with firm performance, other researchers have recently concluded 
that there might be solutions where government ownership increases corporate value.  In 
particular, Lihui Tian and Saul Estrin find that the relationship between corporate value 
and government ownership becomes positive as long as the size of government 
shareholdings reaches 25%. See Lihui Tian & Saul Estrin, Retained State Shareholding 
in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Always Reduce Corporate Value?, 36 J.
COMP. ECON. 74, 85 (2008); Zuobao Wei et al., Ownership Structure and Firm Value in 
China’s Privatized Firms: 1991–2001, 40 J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 87, 89 (2005).
31. John Vickers & George Yarrow, Economic Perspectives on Privatization, 5 J.
ECON. PERSP. 111, 115 (1991).
32. Id. at 113, 115.
33. Zingales, supra note 28, at 1631.  Considering the firm as the set of explicit 
contracts, this model focuses primarily on the equity interest as the only residual claim, 
which bears most of the costs and risks of corporate decisions.  Based on that, equity-
holders are entitled to the right of decision-making. Therefore, the firm should be 
governed from the perspective of shareholders’ supremacy.  Id.
34. Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint, 88 
AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3, 23 (1998) (arguing that loss-making SOEs in China create an 
enormous drain on government budgets and state-owned banks, and that this loss 
eventually forced the government to adopt the privatization program).
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credibility among the population and international investors.  Recent 
empirical studies point out that poor economic institutions shorten the 
expected tenures of autocrats and weaken their hold on power.35 In other 
words, well-run and financially sustainable state-owned enterprises comply 
with the state interest of economic development.  In fact, state-owned 
enterprises have become the key instruments for policymakers to achieve 
economic diversification, provide socio-economic stability, boost 
technological potential, and retain political control.  Transition economies 
can benefit from state-owned enterprises’ operations through expanded tax 
revenues, dividends, sponsorship, and socio-economic projects carried out by 
state-owned enterprises.
This means the hypothesis that politicians tend to maintain poor 
institutions to personally benefit from them seems quite unconvincing today.  
International integration and foreign investments unavoidably compel 
governments to implement further institutional reforms.36 Many SOEs are 
listed on international stock exchanges in order to attract investors from 
abroad; therefore, it is a matter of state interest to ensure that these firms are 
profitable, transparent, and in compliance with the listing standards.37
Because of the lack of domestic capital and information capacities, access to 
international capital and technological resources becomes important for 
economies in transition.  To obtain this access, they must commit themselves 
to international listing and accounting standards.
Prior studies largely fail to properly identify and distinguish different 
forms of state ownership.38 While all forms of state corporate vehicles are 
ultimately owned by the state, they differ in many aspects.  Nonetheless, state-
owned companies have a variety of corporate structures and governance 
models.39 In particular, some of them have the corporate form of a state entity 
per se.40 These entities usually exist for a particular socio-economic agenda.41
In this regard, in order to operate, the government grants these entities a 
portion of state assets.42 As a consequence, state entities are subject to direct 
35. Randall G. Holcombe & Christopher J. Boudreaux, Institutional Quality and the 
Tenure of Autocrats, 156 PUB. CHOICE 409, 412, 420 (2013).
36. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: 
Lessons for Developing Democracies 45, 58, 64 (Colum. L. Sch. L. & Econ. Stud., 
Working Paper No. 371, 2010).
37. See generally Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in 
Transition Economies: Lessons from China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 184, 185 (2005) 
(giving an example of a state taking interest in its exchange listed enterprises); John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market 
Competition on International Corporate Governance 8–9 (Colum. L. Sch. Ctr. L. & Econ. 
Stud., Working Paper No. 205, 2002), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.
cfm?abstract_id=315840 [https://perma.cc/A48L-CPQR] (explaining the effect of 
transparency on a listed-enterprises regulatory structure).
38. See Haggarty & Shirley, supra note 2, at 497.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Vickers & Yarrow, supra note 31.
42. Zuobao Wei et al., Ownership Structure and Firm Value in China’s Privatized 
Firms: 1991–2001, 40 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 87, 88 (2005) (giving an 
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state management and control.43 They are strictly limited in their investment 
and commercial activities.  Additionally, they are exclusively funded from 
the state budget and have to transfer their profit back to the state.44
Another type of state-owned company is the share-based, profit-oriented 
corporation (typically with the form of a limited liability company or a joint 
stock company) (hereinafter “SOEs”), where the government has formally 
withdrawn from management and keeps the position of a shareholder.45
These SOEs have been corporatized and listed on domestic and international 
stock exchanges.46 As a result, the formal governance structure of many 
SOEs looks similar to their private counterparts including such corporate 
bodies as a general meeting of shareholders, a board of directors, and an audit 
committee.47 Many SOEs have minority shareholders and independent 
directors in their corporate structures.48  SOEs and private companies have 
become subject to the same governance and accounting standards and 
regulations.  These changes in the SOEs’ formal governance structures have 
example of how China has managed state assets in listed companies).
43. Id.
44. In Kazakhstan, state entities usually operate in such industries as energy or water 
supply, health care, national parks, professional education, or academic research.  See U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF ECON. & BUS. AFF., 2015 KAZAKHSTAN INVESTMENT 
CLIMATE STATEMENT 11 (2015), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
241825.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4QS-AXNS] (demonstrating an example of energy 
companies owned by the Kazakhstani government that are funded by the state budget and 
that are required to submit profits to the state).  As the result of the social-economic nature 
of state entities, the government controls their pricing policies, making state funding the 
only source of their financing.  See id. at 7.  In turn, state entities have to transfer the main 
portion of their net profit to the state budget.  If a state entity accomplishes its socio-
economic goals, it can be reorganized or liquidated.  See World Bank, Kazakhstan - Low 
Oil Prices, an Opportunity to Reform, WORLD BANK (2015), http://www.worldbank.org/
en/country/kazakhstan/publication/kazakhstan-economic-update-spring-2015 [https://
perma.cc/6MY7-2367].  It is worth mentioning that state entities have become a quite 
obsolete corporate form remaining from the Soviet times.  In Kazakhstan today, many 
state entities have been reorganized in the form of joint-stock companies, or JSCs.  See 
Order of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Dec. 14, 2012, No. 1539 (Kaz.), 
http://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=57120 [https://perma.cc/NW9F-TF8H].
45. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV. [OECD], OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 14 (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
docserver/download/2615061e.pdf?expires=1478880010&id=id&accname=guest&
checksum=BAC7C274D4BE04DA1A942F11D36767D9 [https://perma.cc/CBA5-
R7SQ] (listing the various corporate forms of state-owned enterprises).
46. See Corinna-Barbara Francis, Quasi-Public, Quasi-Private Trends in Emerging 
Market Economies: The Case of China, 33 COMP. POL. 275, 284 (2001) (“[S]tate-owned 
enterprises . . . have transformed themselves into quasi-autonomous, corporatist entities.”); 
see, e.g., David Ralston et al., Today’s State-Owned Enterprises of China: Are They Dying 
Dinosaurs or Dynamic Dynamos?, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 825, 827 (2006) (noting 
China’s decision in the 1990s to list many large state-owned firms on exchanges).
47. See Ralston et al., supra note 46, at 828.
48. By and large, SOE reform has targeted the application of the principles of private 
management to SOEs with the only difference being the nature of the owner: a state 
institutional investor instead of a private actor.  As a result, boundaries between public and 
private as well as between state and market become quite vague.  Many SOEs demonstrate 
quasi-public, quasi-private features.  See id. at 832–33; see also Francis, supra note 46, at 
280–82.
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modified the substance of corporate governance in state companies by 
producing a new composition of incentives and objectives as opposed to 
traditional state entities.49
At the same time, the legitimacy of using the private sector’s
benchmarks, specifically the net profit generated by SOEs, to assess their 
performance is questionable.50 One of the peculiarities of the state sector is 
the presence of different priorities (for instance, social and public policy 
issues) rather than just a SOE’s financial performance and market value.51
Furthermore, it is often difficult to calculate a SOE’s market value, especially 
in the case of non-listed SOEs, which have no market-valued share prices that 
(at least approximately) indicate their performance.52 Even if an SOE’s
shares are traded on a domestic stock exchange, market conditions such as an 
illiquid stock market, weak infrastructure, as well as little or no competition 
in the industry, may eliminate the chance to measure a SOE’s performance in 
accordance with market value criteria.53 In this context, the private sector’s
standards provide little assistance in assessing the SOEs’ financial 
performance.54
However, if we expand the conventional meaning of corporate value 
beyond just net income, and include tax revenues and socio-economic 
benefits created by the SOE’s activities, the meaning of what is efficient in 
terms of a state corporate vehicle can change as well.55 In this context, tax 
49. For instance, Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth, and Liping Xu classify state owners 
of China’s listed companies into three major types based on their political and economic 
interests: state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), SOEs affiliated with the central 
government, and SOEs affiliated with the local government.  They argue that these three 
types of state owners have very different objectives when it comes to the listed firms they 
control.  See Gongmeng Chen, Michael Firth & Liping Xu, Does the Type of Ownership 
Control Matter? Evidence from China’s Listed Companies, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 171, 172 
(2009).
50. See Corporatisation, supra note 9, at 46–47.
51. Accordingly, multiple objectives result in incentive structures quite different from 
those in the private sector.  “Firms can take steps to improve governance.  For instance, 
they can choose to hire high quality auditors or to have independent directors.  Such steps 
enable corporate insiders to reduce their ownership stake in the firm’s cash flows and 
hence make it possible to raise more capital externally.” Rene M. Stulz, Financial 
Globalization, Corporate Governance and Eastern Europe, in FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT,
INTEGRATION AND STABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM CENTRAL, EASTERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN 
EUROPE 16, 20 (Klaus Liebscher et al. eds., 2006).
52. Corporatisation, supra note 9, at 46–47.
53. Id.
54. In this regard, some scholars suggest that the traditional point of view focuses on 
what transition systems lack, as opposed to how they actually function.  See Lin & 
Milhaupt, supra note 13, at 750–51.
55. See Joseph Heath & Wayne Norman, Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Governance 
and Public Management: What Can the History of State-Run Enterprises Teach Us in the 
Post-Enron Era?, 53 J. BUS. ETHICS 247, 258 (2004) (discussing the inability to compare 
efficiencies of state-owned companies using criteria that measures profit-maximization 
and stating that “[h]aving the single directive of profit-maximization permits comparisons 
across firms, because all managers are trying to do roughly the same thing, in a similar 
economic environment.  But if managers have the freedom to balance objectives as they 
see fit, then the basis for comparison disappears . . . .” This leads to the case, when “[a] 
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revenues, employment, social programs, and other goods generated by SOEs 
can be included in SOE value.  Based on this rationale, governments can treat 
SOE efficiency relative to whether the SOEs’ objectives outlined by their 
shareholders have been achieved.  While one of these objectives is an increase 
in profit, governments can take a rather broader track and evaluate SOE 
performance from the perspective of social welfare and long-term, socio-
economic benefits provided to the population and business community.  
Accordingly, the purpose of SOEs is not only making money but also 
accomplishing national industrial development and fair redistribution of 
resources in the absence of an adequate “marketplace.”56
Thus, corporate governance in SOEs is likely to be more complex than 
in private firms.57 Multiple objectives of SOEs have produced a system in 
which corporate efficiency is measured relative to the SOEs’ actual agenda, 
including but not limited to the maximization of shareholder wealth.58 This, 
in turn, creates several obstacles.  While private firms typically have a 
common goal of profit maximization that is a relatively straightforward index 
to measure the performance of managers, SOEs often have several goals that 
might conflict with each other.  Many SOEs’ goals are not easily assessed 
since there is no clear understanding of what the benchmarks are.59
Moreover, non-listed SOEs do not have a market-valued share price.  The 
ambiguity of measurement standards brings about monitoring difficulties
when monitoring agencies barely know how to evaluate the costs and benefits 
of SOEs’ operations and how the achieved results trade off and fit into the 
country’s socio-economic goals. Therefore, we may assume that the costs of 
SOE management and control are still quite high because of the multiple 
objectives of SOEs.  On balance, states are ready to assume short-term losses 
in profit from their SOEs and offset them by generating long-term socio-
economic benefits. Thus, the response to what constitutes SOE efficiency 
can be found in the institutional environment of transition economies.60
firm that puts more emphasis upon regional equality, or employment security, would 
simply not be comparable to a firm that put more emphasis on profitability.”).
56. Corporatisation, supra note 9, at 45.
57. See Dongwei Su & Xingxing He, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance 
and Productive Efficiency in China, 38 J. PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 303, 315 (2011) 
(providing an example of a study of ownership structure’s effect on efficiency and 
accounting for the additional complexities inherent in determining the efficiency of a 
SOE). See generally Aoki & Kim, supra note 10, at 9; Chen, Firth & Xu, supra note 49, 
at 172; Dongwei Su, Corporate Finance and State Enterprise Reform in China, 16 CHINA 
ECON. REV. 118, 118 (2007).
58. Chen, Firth & Xu, supra note 49, at 172–74; Su & He, supra note 57, at 306.
59. Su & He, supra note 57, at 306.
60. Dewenter & Malatesta, supra note 2, at 320 (“[W]hether government firms are 
more or less efficient than private firms is primarily an empirical issue.  To date the body 
of empirical evidence is mixed.”).  Other scholars, however, present a body of evidence 
supporting the view that government firms are intrinsically no less efficient than private 
firms.  See generally Douglas W. Caves & Laurits R. Christensen, The Relative Efficiency 
of Public and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: The Case of Canadian 
Railroads, 88 J. POL. ECON. 958, 958–76 (1980); Stacey R. Kole & J. Harold Mulherin, 
The Government as a Shareholder: A Case from the United States, 40 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1–
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 34 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 34 Side A      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
NURGOZHAYEVA FORMATTED (4-10-17) 7/5/2017 3:26 PM
2017 State Ownership in Terms of Transition 59
II. Institutional Context of Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is a large, sparsely populated, transition economy.61 It is 
abundant with mineral resources, especially oil and gas.62 Hence, due to 
commodity exports, Kazakhstan’s per capita income has increased 
significantly.63  Nonetheless, Kazakhstani policymakers acknowledge that 
the country faces a number of challenges arising from its dependence on 
resource exports.64 Therefore, economic diversification has become a key 
objective of the state’s policies, and many state industrial programs have been 
approved in the last ten years.65 For example, the system of state development 
institutions, which includes two sovereign wealth funds, has been created in 
order to reduce the dependence on commodity exports.66
In today’s Kazakhstan, the state plays the central role in the country’s
economic development.67 This role has been affirmed in “Strategy 
Kazakhstan 2050,” which was introduced by President Nazarbayev.68
According to “Strategy Kazakhstan 2050,” an economically steady state is 
particularly important to ensure the country’s accelerated economic growth 
and effective economic planning in terms of existing macroeconomic and 
institutional conditions.69 In his interview with the Russian news channel 
“Russia 24,” President Nazarbayev mentioned that he has become 
disappointed in the idea of a liberal economy and believes that a planned 
economic system is more advantageous.70
At the dawn of independence, however, Kazakhstan followed an 
opposite path of development.  The old concepts of a planned economy, a 
powerful state and government market intervention, were discredited.71 The 
22 (1997); Stephen Martin & David Parker, The Impact of UK Privatisation on Labour 
and Total Factor Productivity, 42 SCOTTISH J. POL. ECON. 201, 201–20 (1995).
61. JESUS FELIPE & CHANGYONG RHEE, REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF 
KAZAKHSTAN: POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE DIVERSIFICATION IN ASIA IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 1 (2013), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/30432/
kazakhstan-policies-industrial-service-diversification.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CJ2-
C3NM]; Timur M. Aliev, Kazakhstan: Resource Curse or Dutch Disease?, 57 PROBS.
ECON. TRANSITION 1, 4 (2016).
62. FELIPE & RHEE, supra note 61.
63. Id.; Aliev, supra note 61, at 9–12.
64. FELIPE & RHEE, supra note 61.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id. at 9.
67. See Eimear O’Casey & Alexander Batchilo, Kazakhstan: Privatization Versus 
Control, FORBES (July 28, 2016, 10:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2016/
07/28/kazakhstan-privatization-versus-control/#4a6c1752de4d [https://perma.cc/HGQ5-
LWBU].
68. See Nursultan Nazarbayev, President, Kaz., Strategy “Kazakhstan 2050,” Address 
at the Annual State of the Nation (Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.kazembassy.org.uk/en/
pages/page/20 [https://perma.cc/3UWD-YQAG].
69. Id. 
70. Igor Pereverzev, Nash otvet Chemberlenu [Our Response to Chamberlain], 
ZKSLERR KAZAKHSTAN [EXPERT KAZ.] (May 28, 2012), http://expertonline.kz/a1051 
[https://perma.cc/DF29-8F7A].
71. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Res., Economic Flexibility, Address before the 
National Italian American Foundation (Oct. 12, 2005), in FED. RES. BROAD, https://
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idea of a free market economy captivated the minds of the political leadership.  
The “invisible hand of the market” as the supreme driving force of economic 
development replaced state regulation in the majority of industries.72
Privatization was the most important element of the Kazakhstani business 
community’s growth during the first ten years of its independence.73  State 
properties privatized at that time have become the basis for many large private 
companies today.74 The state delegated the governance of privatized entities 
to a newly formed group of managers.75 Many of those enterprises survived 
and succeeded.76 However, the lack of professional knowledge and 
experience of corporate and risk management, and the absence of contract 
enforcement and proper commitment devices, brought about many failures.77
At the beginning of the 2000s, many private companies founded in the 1990s 
expanded and eventually emerged as financial industrial groups, which 
usually included commercial banks in order to manage financial flows within 
the groups.78 As their business expanded, private groups required additional 
external capital, which they typically borrowed from abroad.79 As a result, 
during the global recession of 2008, many domestic corporations, and 
especially commercial banks, were heavily burdened by foreign credit 
obligations.80 Therefore, when foreign capital left the country, domestic 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20051012 [https://perma.cc/Q945-
SQA3].
72. Id.
73. Amalbayev Asilbek, Adam Smit v Astane [Adam Smith in Astana], ZKSLERR 
KAZAKHSTAN [EXPERT KAZ.] (Dec. 17, 2012), http://expertonline.kz/a645/ [https://perma.
cc/J4B7-ACF6].
74. For example, the state-owned Karaganda Regional Steel Mill was transformed 
into JSC Ispat Karmet, a private company.  See id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. In this regard, President Nazarbayev, in his book “The Kazakhstan Way,” recalled 
that after Kazakhstan’s young entrepreneurs took over the management of Air Kazakhstan, 
they made such a mess that Kazakhstan’s aircraft began being impounded in foreign 
airports, and “[f]oreign companies refused to let their employees fly on Air Kazakhstan 
flights because of their poor safety standards.  Had it not been for [Nazarbayev’s] decision 
to set up the Kazakhstan-British joint company Air Astana, we would have no airline at 
all now.” NURSULTAN NAZARBAYEV, THE KAZAKHSTAN WAY 172 (2008).
78. See Asilbek, supra note 73.
79. See id.
80. According to a 2008 report commissioned by Microfinance Initiative for Asia 
(MIFA), a joint venture of the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group 
and KfW Bankengruppe,
[t]he credit boom in Kazakhstan was fuelled by high levels of foreign currency 
borrowing by domestic banks until the second half of 2007, when foreign 
borrowing declined drastically as the global financial crisis reached the country.  
In third quarter 2007, the net inflow of foreign lending to the financial sector was 
just $200 million—a decline of $8.9 billion compared to the previous six months.
KAZAKHSTAN: MICROFINANCE AND FINANCIAL SECTOR DIAGNOSTIC STUDY,
MICROFINANCE INITIATIVE FOR ASIA [MIFA] 5 (2008), https://www.microfinance
gateway.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-kazakhstan-microfinance-and-financial-
sector-diagnostic-study-apr-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN53-9GLA].
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companies were severely hit by the scarcity of capital.81 This, in turn, 
affected the growth of GDP and created a deficit of funds for new and existing 
projects.82 In those circumstances, the government of Kazakhstan undertook 
the leading role in financing the economy.83
Today, the banking system in Kazakhstan remains unstable.84 The time 
when high profitability was driven by the growth of export revenues and 
foreign loans has passed.85 Commercial banks have scrutinized commercial 
financing, making it less risky, more secure, and thus, more expensive for 
borrowers.86 Most banks prefer to secure their lending for large private 
companies and SOEs.87 In contrast, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(“SMEs”) have a quite small share of the banks’ loan portfolios, although the 
government has set a target to increase the share to 40%.88  As a matter of 
fact, in order to obtain a loan, entrepreneurs must comply with particular 
criteria: high productivity, export orientation, substantial investments in fixed 
assets, innovative activities, and mandatory participation with their own 
funds.89 The share of own funds must be at least 20% of the total investments 
in a project.90 Moreover, commercial banks typically require liquid collateral 
to secure a loan.91 However, in the situation when property rights are not 
sufficiently protected and contract enforcement is weak, it is quite 
challenging for many entrepreneurs to fulfill the collateral requirement since 
81. World Bank Group [WBG], IBRD Program Document for a Proposed 
Development Policy Lending Loan to Kazakhstan, at 1, WBG Doc. 53575-KZ (Apr. 27, 
2010).
82. See World Bank Group [WBG], Oil Rules: Kazakhstan’s Policy Options in a 
Downturn, at viii, WBG Doc. 82509 (2013).
83. See id.
84. In particular, according to consolidated financial statements of large commercial 
banks for the first quarter of 2013, many of them decreased their net profits or suffered 
from losses. Svetlana Gribanova, God nachalsja s ubytkov [The Year Began with Losses],
ZKSLERR KAZAKHSTAN [EXPERT KAZ.] (May 27, 2013), http://expertonline.kz/a11015 
[https://perma.cc/BG8H-HU8C].  Each bank has specific reasons for the negative financial 
results, but it might be assumed that further depreciation of the loan portfolio and increased 
spending on the creation of provisions on non-performing loans (“NPLs”) may persist.  Id.
85. See Asilbek, supra note 73.
86. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV. [OECD], IMPROVING ACCESS TO FINANCE IN 
KAZAKHSTAN’S AGRIBUSINESS SECTOR 25–26 (2013), https://www.oecd.org/countries/
kazakhstan/Improving%20Access%20to%20Finance%20in%20Kazakhstan’s%20Agribu
siness%20Sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2Z9-2FMR].
87. Samruk-Kazyna, Banki—jeto gosudarstvo [Banks—The State], ZKSLERR 
KAZAKHSTAN [EXPERT KAZ.] (May 20, 2013), http://expertonline.kz/a10939 [https://
perma.cc/HFZ5-TKZK].
88. Id.
89. O bankah i bankovskoj dejatel’nosti v Respublike Kazahstan [On Banks and 
Banking Activity in the Republic of Kazakhstan], Aug. 31, 1995 (Kaz.), translated at 
http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1003931 [https://perma.cc/3PRJ-TZQT]
[hereinafter Law on Banks and Banking Activity].
90. Id.
91. Predlagayet samyi vygodnyi credit pod zalog nedvizhimosti [What Kazakhstan 
Offers the Most Convenient Bank Loan Secured by Real Estate], FORBES KAZ. (Sept. 2, 
2015), http://forbes.kz/process/property/kakoy_bank_predlagaet_samyiy_vyigodnyiy_
kredit_pod_zalog_nedvijimosti [https://perma.cc/HNA3-4ZNW].
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they prefer not to disclose their property.92 Hence, entrepreneurs have 
become largely deprived of bank financing as a major source of capital.
One of the surveys has demonstrated that the main challenge for 
Kazakhstani business today is raising capital.93 This means that private actors 
have possessed quite limited liquid funds to invest in alternative and resource-
consuming industries in an attempt to achieve economic diversification.94
Rather, they often favor speculative and short-term interests.  In this regard, 
the Kazakhstani State Agency of Statistics has found that private investors 
prefer to invest in the extraction and export of natural resources rather than 
support the development of alternative industries, which absorb much higher 
capital costs with a more distant possibility of return.95 Official statistics also
uncover the low innovative activity of domestic entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan.  
The share of innovative products within the total volume of domestic 
92. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 47 (2000).
93. This research distinguishes male and female entrepreneurs.  Despite all 
differences, 64.2% of women and 56.2% of men emphasize the problem of limited capital 
resources.  Paul J. Davis & Fatima Abdiyeva, Self-Employment in a Post-Soviet Economy: 
Entrepreneurship and Gender Differences in Kazakhstan, in IX KIMEP INTERNATIONAL 
RESEARCH CONFERENCE 91, 96 (2012).  The second challenge is implementation of labor 
law provisions (35.7% of female and 37.5% of male entrepreneurs).  See id. at 91.
94. Russia can also illustrate this argument.  In fact, one of the studies revealed that
Russian businesses were reluctant to invest in new technologies.  According to a 
survey by the Higher School of Economics, in 2010, the natural resource 
extraction remained the most active area of investment.  Most disturbingly, the 
survey revealed the tendency to put new investments not into buying new 
technologies but in repairing and maintenance of the old obsolete equipment.
Irina Busygina & Mikhail Filippov, Benefits and Risk of Political Modernization in Russia,
in WAITING FOR REFORM UNDER PUTIN AND MEDVEDEV 213, 230–33 (Lena Jonson & 
Stephen White eds., 2012).
95. In accordance with the IMF survey, value added by the oil sector accounted for 
11.5% of the GDP in 2010, with oil exports representing nearly 57% of total exports of 
goods and services. IMF, Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 
11/151, at 27 (June 2011).  Furthermore, according to the report, the bulk of foreign direct 
investment (nearly 75.25% in 2010) has flowed to the sector for extractive industries, 
particularly to oil, which accounts for the largest share.  See id. The Kazakhstani 
authorities tend to actively involve foreign investors, especially those interested in 
Kazakhstani natural resources, in the process of industrialization.  See, e.g., Foreign Inv. 
Counsel, Regulations of the Joint Innovative-Technological Development and Economy 
Diversification Working Group (Joint Innovative-Tech. Dev. & Econ. Diversification 
Working Group, 2015), http://www.fic.kz/eng/rabochie-gruppy/ITDED%20WG/
regulations-itdedwg.php [https://perma.cc/FG7K-6BTP]. Speaking at the 25th meeting of 
the Foreign Investors Council, President Nazarbayev emphasized the importance of 
foreign investors in the development of alternative industries.  The President added that 
both the government and the council should focus on the expansion of foreign capital and 
technologies in the implementation of the country’s industrialization and innovation 
strategy.  See Nursultan Nazarbayev, President, Kaz., Address at the 25th Foreign 
Investors Council (Dec. 15, 2012), in AKORDA (May 2012), http://www.akorda.kz/ru/
speeches/external_political_affairs/ext_speeches_and_addresses/zaklyuchitelnoe-slovo-
prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-nazarbaeva-n-a-na-25-m-zasedanii-soveta-
inostrannykh-in [https://perma.cc/YJ8L-5283]; Next FIC Session to Focus on Innovative 
Development, KAZINFORM (May 22, 2012), http://www.inform.kz/en/next-fic-session-to-
focus-on-innovative-development_a2465749 [https://perma.cc/E5KS-YTZB].
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production fluctuates just between 0.5–1.65% across the country.96
Alternative capital arrangements, such as the securities market, also fail 
to provide sufficient capital to entrepreneurs.  Tremendous appreciation of 
the banking sector as one of the leading industries has resulted in very limited 
liquidity in this market.97 There has been no ground to expect the issuance of 
new liquid financial instruments in the domestic securities market, or to 
anticipate the general improvement of capital markets liquidity in the near 
future.98 In this situation, state securities have obtained a dominant share in 
corporate investments.  In fact, as of December 1, 2016, government 
securities amounted to 44.16% of the investment portfolio of pension funds—
96. U.N., Econ. Comm. for Eur., Innovation Performance Review of Kazakhstan, 
U.N. Doc. ECE/CECI/14, at 10 (2012).
97. Briefly, although Kazakhstan’s financial system embraces the securities market 
and nonbanking financial institutions such as credit partnerships, mortgage companies, 
and microcredit organizations, the Kazakhstani financial market is predominantly bank-
based.  See Tatyana Batischeva, Staraya pesnya o glavnom [It is Time to Invite the 
Exchange SMEs], EXPERT KAZ. (Dec. 5, 2011), http://expertonline.kz/mag/2011/48/
[https://perma.cc/T6VG-YVF6]; Askar Yelemessov, Are Kazakh Bankers Capable of 
Financing the Growth of the Kazakh Economy?, CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE ET D’INDUSTRIE 
FRANCE KAZ. (May 2011), www.france.kz/ru/documents,18.html.  Kazakhstan has a two-
tier banking system with the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan on top.  See
Law on Banks and Banking Activity, supra note 89, art. 3.  The National Bank is 
accountable to the President of the country, and is the principal regulator of the financial 
market and financial organizations.  Id. The degree of concentration in the banking sector 
has always been substantial, with the only difference that the largest commercial banks 
became state-owned after the 2008 financial crisis.  See Farhad Karagusov, Pravovye 
aspekty bankovskogo crisisa v Kazakhstane [Legal Aspects of the Banking Crisis in 
Kazakhstan], ZAKON (2010), http://online.zakon.kz/Document/
?doc_id=31664356#pos=64;-227 [https://perma.cc/AR5X-26QZ].  The share of banking 
sector assets to GDP became 42.8%.  The share of five largest banks in total assets 
amounted to 53.1% of the total bank assets.  The share of the five largest banks in the total 
loan portfolio was 58.7%, and in the total deposit portfolio—51%.  See Otkrytoe zasedanie 
Mezhdunarodnogo Koordinacionnogo Soveta bankovskih associacij stran SNG, 
Central’noj i Vostochnoj Evropy (Mezhdunarodnyj Bankovskij Sovet, MBS): Sbornik 
Analiticheskih Materialov [Open Meeting of the International Coordination Council of 
Banking Associations in the CIS, Central and Eastern Europe (International Banking 
Council, MBS): Collection of Analytical Materials], BANK ASS’N REPUBLIC KAZ., http://
www.kba.kz/rus/analitics/ [https://perma.cc/4EA7-DVTG] (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
98. The current picture of the Kazakhstani securities market is quite simple: 53% of 
the market is the currency trade ($6,832.1 million), 42% is repurchase agreement deals 
($5,364 million), 3.9% is government securities ($503 million), 0.4% ($56 million) is 
shares, and 0.3% ($39.2 million) is corporate bonds.  See Tatiana Batishcheva, Investor 
Zhazhdet Svobody, EXPERT KAZ. (Mar. 4, 2013), http://expertonline.kz/a10365/ [https://
perma.cc/BAL8-EGY6].
The majority of operations on the Kazakhstani stock exchange (KASE) include debt 
securities (43.3%) and government securities (37.1%).  COMMITTEE FOR THE CONTROL &
SUPERVISION, ANNUAL REPORT OF FINANCIAL MARKET AND FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS OF
THE NATIONAL BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN FOR 2012, at 71 (2012). As of 
January 1, 2013 the total market capitalization of non-government securities included in 
the official list of the KASE, was 10,114.5 billion tenge or only one third of the country’s
GDP.  See id. Therefore, the domestic securities market suffers from limited liquidity.  
The dominance of commercial banking in the capital market has largely determined such 
a generic feature of the Kazakhstani stock market as a small number of reliable issuers and 
investors.
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the largest institutional investors in the country.99
The reality of Kazakhstan’s market is that so far, private businesses have 
primarily concentrated on industries guaranteeing a quick return on 
investment (such as the export of raw materials, real estate, trade, and 
construction).  Kazakhstani companies have largely lost opportunities to 
attract foreign capital.  Capital continues to be available solely for large 
companies, the majority of which are SOEs.100 The majority of domestic 
entrepreneurs are financially unable to perform a leading role in the process 
of industrialization and compete in the global market.101
To efficiently channel and allocate the inflows of foreign exchange to 
the economy, the government has created a system of state asset management 
and development institutions including two domestic sovereign wealth funds: 
the National Fund of Kazakhstan and the Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-
Kazyna.102 These institutions have become the primary vehicles for 
Kazakhstani policymakers to achieve economic diversification, provide 
socio-economic stability, and retain political control.103 They serve to 
accumulate and preserve wealth, diminish resource-dependence, and 
accomplish the industrialization of Kazakhstan’s economy.104 Put 
99. The numbers have been updated with the most recent statistics as of December 
2016.  Investment Structure of APFs Portfolio, NAT’L BANK KAZ. (Dec. 1, 2016), http://
www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=729&switch=english [https://perma.cc/LFA8-7HPY].
100. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF ECON. & BUS. AFF., 2014 KAZAKHSTAN 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT 16 (June 2014).
101. See generally Innovative Industrial Development Strategy of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan for 2003–2015, President Decree May 17, 2003, 3–4 (Kaz.).
102. These funds are among the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world by assets 
under management with 17th and 13th positions, respectively.  See Tracking the Activity 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Pensions, and other Public Funds, SWFI,
www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/F6PA-8JMT] (last visited Nov. 
15, 2016); The Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds by Assets Under Management,
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (Sept. 16, 2011), www.sovereignwealthfundsnews.com/
ranking.php [https://perma.cc/2BCG-9VS2].
103. It is claimed that the Kazakhstani structure of state asset management was created 
in the image of Singaporean and Malaysian funds.  G. Sansyzbayeva & Zh. Ametova, The 
Role of “Samruk-Kazyna” Sovereign Wealth Fund in Implementation of State Programs 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 11 ASIAN SOC. SCI. 1, 1 (2015).  In 2003, President 
Nazarbayev visited Singapore and Malaysia and was inspired by their SWF systems, 
which were tightly linked to the ruling families and the government. Rakhat T. Akhmet 
et al., Framing the Diplomatic Ties Between Kazakhstan and Malaysia, 2 J. SOC. SCI. &
HUMAN. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 162, 163 (2015).  After that trip, management consultant 
McKinsey was hired to advise on the possible structure of Kazakhstani SOEs based on 
comparative studies of state companies around the world, from oil funds of the Gulf States, 
Temasek, and Khazanah, to the Scandinavian funds.  Eric Ellis, Samruk: The Outsider’s
Inside Story, EUROMONEY, Jan. 2008, at 94.  However, for as long as Kazakhstani financial 
and political systems have been evolving, Kazakhstani funds have obtained certain 
features of other SWFs, for instance the Chinese China Investment Corporation (“CIC”).  
China Investment Corporation Buys Stake in Kakakh Gas Company for $939 Million, 
SWF INST. (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-funds/china-
investment-corporation-buys-stake-in-kazakh-gas-company-for-939-million/ [https://
perma.cc/A8W2-9G3B].
104. Essentially, oil revenue accounts for one quarter of GDP, half of fiscal revenues, 
and two-thirds of export proceeds.  See IMF, Republic of Kazakhstan: 2012 Article IV 
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differently, the government has made an attempt to bring forward benefits 
from the country’s rich resources in order to overcome commodity-
dependence.105
The system of state institutions is grounded in the concept of the best 
standards of corporate governance and accountability.106 The concept defines 
the relationship between the government and SOEs as a form of cooperation, 
where the government delegates some of its functions to the market and 
largely acts through stimulation and regulation.107 SOE management is 
expected to switch to a customer-oriented model grounded in market 
categories such as profitability, competition, transparency, business 
initiatives, and equal access to capital.108 The new concept of state 
management also implies an active involvement of private organizations in 
activities traditionally carried out by the state sector in Kazakhstan.109 The 
eventual objective of the new concept is to increase SOE efficiency, with a 
primary focus on the citizens’ needs, by the transfer of some economic 
functions to the market.110
Using accumulated capital reserves,111 state authorities seek to accelerate 
the development of non-commodity industries and particularly to increase the 
share of manufacturing in the GDP, to improve productivity in agriculture, 
and to boost the country’s technological potential.112 In this regard, the 
government employs state procurements to support and finance the national 
Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 12/164, at 16 (June 2012).
105. Some scholars argue that two factors may explain why mineral wealth limits 
industrialization:
First, a mineral-rich country experiences an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
that prevents it from reducing its net imports and moving up the industrial 
ladder . . . . Second, because mineral extraction is a capital-intensive process, a 
country without a deep industrial base will find its (initially) scarce physical 
capital diverted to mining, and hence will lack the necessary resources to deepen 
capital levels in the industrial sector.
See IMF, Country Report No. 11/151, supra note 95, at 31.
106. Zakon Respubliki Kazahstan o Fonde Nacional’nogo BlagosostojAnija [VP RK] 
[Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Sovereign Wealth Fund], 2012, No. 4, Art. 29 
(Kaz.).
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See O Fonde nacional’nogo blagosostojanija [ZK RK] [On the Fund of National 
Welfare], Feb. 1, 2012, No. 550-IV (Kaz.), translated at http://online.zakon.kz/Document/
?doc_id=31122521 [https://perma.cc/FT4E-UAML].
111. One study estimates the consolidated revenue of the Sovereign Wealth Fund, 
Samruk-Kazyna, as 20–30% of the country’s GDP, and the assets of Samruk-Kazyna from 
50–80% of GDP.  See David Kemme, Sovereign Wealth Fund Issues and The National 
Fund(s) of Kazakhstan 3 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 1036, 2012).
112. 2 *RVXGDUVWYHQQRƱ SURJUDPPH SR IRUVLURYDQQRPX LQGXVWULDOүQR-
innovaWִ sionnomu razvitiLִ u Respubliki Kazaɯstan na 2010-2014 gody i priznanii 
utrativshimi silu nekotoryɯ ukazov Prezidenta Respubliki Kazaɯstan [On the State 
program for accelerated industrial-innovative development of Kazakhstan for 2010-2014 
and abrogating certain decrees of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan], 
KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, Mar. 31, 2010, No. 74, Item 26135.
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economy.113 Today, the government and SOEs are one of the most solvent 
and reliable customers, and significant state funds continue to be distributed 
to the private sector in the form of government contracts.114 The government 
has become a substitute for private investments in terms of financing, 
monitoring, and implementing national industrial projects. Accordingly, 
public expenditures have been rapidly increasing.  A growing share of public 
expenditures (up from US $4 billion in 1999 to US $25 billion in 2007) was 
assigned for social programs, housing, infrastructure, and public 
employment.115
III. The Tradeoff of State Ownership in Kazakhstan
A. Benefits of SOE
There is value generated by SOEs in Kazakhstan.  First, the state budget 
benefits from the operations of SOEs through tax revenues and dividends.  To 
be specific, SOEs facilitate the expansion of the state taxable base in several 
ways.  First, investments in local production potentially increase the 
production capacities and the employment rate of domestic enterprises and, 
consequently, enlarge state tax revenues.116 Second, SOEs themselves are 
some of the largest taxpayers in the country because they cover key economic 
segments, such as oil and gas, mining, transportation, energy, 
telecommunications, and finance.117  These SOEs are integrated in a single 
corporate group structure (“the Group”) with the state-owned Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna (“the Fund”) on the top.118 The Group’s share 
in state tax revenues was 727 billion tenge or 10% of all taxes collected in 
2011, which is 20% more than in 2010.119
Another source of income for the government is dividends.  In fact, in 
2010 the Fund managed to pay dividends to its sole shareholder in the amount 
of more than $60.6 million.120 In 2011, consolidated equity capital of the 
Group amounted to $40 billion.121 During the same period, its consolidated 
113. Id. at 14.
114. In fact, the share of state procurements accounted for approximately 24% in 2014.  
Nurlan Sakuyov, Podderzhka otechestvennogo biznesa v uslovijah VTO [Support for 
Domestic Business in the WTO], ATAMEKEH (July 3, 2015), http://palata.kz/ru/articles/
19018 [https://perma.cc/LKY6-XMQ2].
115. See Enrique Palazuelos & Rafael Fernández, Kazakhstan: Oil Endowment and Oil 
Empowerment, 45 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 27, 27–37 (2012).
116. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND SAMRUK-KAZYNA JOINT STOCK CO., SAMRUK-
KAZYNA, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2011, at 449, 455, 460 (2011)
[hereinafter SAMRUK-KAZYNA, SWF 2011 ANNUAL REPORT].
117. Large commercial banks bailed out by the government as a part of the anti-crisis 
program with a great share of non-profit loans are not officially included in the Group.  
See id. at 452.  This means that these banks with their losses are excluded from the balance 
sheet of SOEs and do not officially impact the Group’s consolidated income.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 447.
120. See id. at 496.
121. See id. at 509, 523, 556.
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book value was almost $90 billion (or 13.423 trillion tenge).122 The 
consolidated revenue of the Group reached 6.34 trillion tenge or 23% of GDP 
in 2011.123
The second benefit of SOEs in Kazakhstan is wealth distribution through 
different social projects.  In 2011, social expenditures not related to 
commercial activities of the Group exceeded $1.7 billion (or 258.7 billion 
tenge).124 In the same year, the amount of losses related to non-profit 
activities amounted nearly $1.3 billion (200 billion tenge).125 For instance, 
the Fund’s subsidiary, Kazakhtelecom JSC, assumed losses from providing 
local telecommunication services to rural regions.126  Another non-profit 
activity of the Fund is sponsorship.  For example, the Fund grants financing 
to sport federations and teams, such as cycling, hockey, soccer, basketball, 
wrestling, tennis, and volleyball.127 According to the CEO of the Fund, Mr. 
Shukeyev, in 2011 the Group financed fourteen sport federations in an 
amount of more than $55.3 million.128 The Fund was also an official partner 
of the Kazakhstani team during the Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games 
in London;129 so in total in 2011, more than $250 million was spent on 
sponsorship.130
The Fund actively participates in many social programs.  For instance, 
the program “Affordable Housing” aims to provide the socially vulnerable 
segment of the population with inexpensive housing.131 Within this program, 
the government plans to construct one million square meters of rental housing 
annually.132 The Fund is financing half of the $6.5 billion (983.8 billion 
tenge) project,133 with the Fund’s share exceeding 70%.134
As a result, during the years 2005–2012, the obligations of the Group 
122. Id. at 531.
123. Id. at 447.
124. Id.
125. Those investments included sponsorship, subsidized services of public 
transportation and communication, and lower oil and gas prices for domestic consumers.  
N.K. Rahmetova, Managing Director, Samruk-Kazyna, Presentation on the Expanded 
Board of Samruk-Kazyna for 2011 (Feb. 3, 2012).
126. JSC KAZAKHTELECOM, REPORT OF JSC KAZAKHTELECOM IN THE FIELD OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 2012, at 29 (2013).
127. Press Release, Samruk-Kazyna, Samruk-Kazyna is an Official Partner of the Nat’l 
Team of Kaz. at the XXX Summer Olympics (June 18, 2012).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. SAMRUK-KAZYNA, DETAILED ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF JSC
“SAMRUK-KAZYNA” FOR 2011, at 5, 15 (June 2012), http://sk.kz/en/about-fund/otchety-i-
plany/?PAGEN_1=10 [https://perma.cc/36S5-9A3L] (report accessible for download).
131. Press Release, Samruk-Kazyna, “Affordable Housing 2020” Program 
Implementation by Real Estate Fund “Samruk-Kazyna” JSC (Nov. 18, 2014), http://sk.kz/
news/view/4034?lang=en [https://perma.cc/F4PU-7WQL].
132. Press Release, Samruk-Kazyna, Outcome of the Samruk-Kazyna’s Session: New 
Guidelines for the Fund’s Grp. of Cos. (Feb. 3, 2012).
133. Id.
134. K.V. Bishimbaeya, Deputy Chairman of the Board, Samruk-Kazyna, Presentation 
on the Expanded Board of Samruk-Kazyna (Feb. 4, 2012).
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 38 Side B      07/06/2017   10:17:34
39262-cin_50-1 Sheet No. 38 Side B      07/06/2017   10:17:34
C M
Y K
NURGOZHAYEVA FORMATTED (4-10-17) 7/5/2017 3:26 PM
68 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50
increased significantly.  As of October 1, 2011, the external debt of the Fund, 
including its subsidiaries (but excluding commercial banks), amounted to 
$21.4 billion, or 17.4% of the gross external debt of Kazakhstan.135 In this 
regard, Fund management intends to accomplish separate accounting for 
commercial and non-commercial activities of the Group.136 This measure is 
considered to provide the Fund with clear market indicators and real
evaluation of the commercial component.
The third component of the SOE value is the increase of local 
production.  In 2010, local procurements equated to 50% of the total volume 
generated by the Group.137 By 2020 the portion of domestic producers is 
expected to exceed 66% for goods and 93% for services.138 The rules on 
procurements, adopted by the Fund, establish certain preferences for local 
suppliers, such as the opportunity for long-term contracting and lending.139
Private actors have been granted a portion of state investments, especially in 
industries such as residential construction, SMEs, and agriculture.140 In 
particular, state investments lessened the impact of the 2008 recession and 
helped GDP grow by 1.2% in 2009, 7% in 2010, and 7.5% in 2011.141  The 
SMEs’ share in GDP almost reached its pre-crisis level and accounted for 
20.2% of GDP in 2010.142
To support the private sector, the Fund has implemented twenty-four 
investment projects worth a total of $15 billion (2.55 trillion tenge) through 
the State Program of Accelerated Industrial and Innovative Development.143
These projects intend to create more than 28,000 jobs.144 It is expected that 
the new portfolio will additionally include 120 projects with a total value of 
roughly $30 billion.145 The total volume of the Fund’s investments in the 
135. Rahmetova, supra note 125.
136. Id.
137. Umirzak Shukeyev, CEO, Address at the Fund’s Corporate Meeting (Apr. 2, 
2012).  
138. Press Release, Samruk-Kazyna, The Development Strategy of Samruk-Kazyna 
for 2012–2022 was Approved by the Government of Kazakhstan (2011).
139. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND SAMRUK-KAZYNA JOINT STOCK CO., SAMRUK-
KAZYNA, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2010, at 29, 30 (2010)
[hereinafter SAMRUK-KAZYNA, SWF ANNUAL REPORT 2010].
140. In February 2009, the government channeled approximately 120 billion tenge to
banks for lending small- and medium-sized enterprises.  See Asilbek, supra note 73.
141. Id.
142. Yerdos Khamzin & Rassul Moldabayev, Statutory Regulation of Small and 
Medium-Scale Entrepreneurship in Kazakhstan, 25 WORLD APPLIED SCI. J. 827, 828 
(2013).
143. In 2010, the Fund implemented twenty-one projects within the state program of 
industrial and innovation development with the amount of US $20 billion, which was 
almost half of the Fund’s investments. SAMRUK-KAZYNA, SWF ANNUAL REPORT 2010,
supra note 139, at 14.  In particular, the Fund provided 93% of investments in energetics, 
86% in oil refining and infrastructure, and 84% in chemistry and pharmacy. Timur 
Kulibayev, Former CEO of the Fund, Address (2010), in SWF 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 
SUPPLEMENT.
144. Bishimbaeya, supra note 134.
145. Id.
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development of new technologies was equal to $53 million (8 billion tenge)
in 2011.146 In 2012, it was ten times more, growing to 92.9 billion tenge.147
This trend continued in 2013 with total investment of 99.2 billion tenge.148
Additionally, the Fund actively promotes the “Park of Innovative 
Technologies” (the Kazakhstani analogue to Silicon Valley).149
In the absence of sufficient and sustained institutions, SOEs have 
undertaken the mission of allocating and expanding socio-economic welfare.  
In this regard, the government emphasizes the importance of a stable and 
predictable environment for further economic growth.150 Given the fact that 
the existing social security and pension systems in Kazakhstan are still 
developing, the risks inherent in a market economy are particularly critical 
for the population.151 To mitigate those inherent risks, the government has 
assumed social responsibility through state ownership and state social and 
pension programs.152
B. The Costs of State Ownership
The system of state ownership in Kazakhstan is deemed to be a response 
to the existing institutional environment.  However, this system causes certain 
costs, including the costs of political considerations, poor profit motivation, 
and multitasking.153
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Analyzing autocratic regimes in Singapore and China, Victor Shih argues that if 
a national leader was quite certain of gaining power over crucial state assets and was less 
concerned about his political survival, he might largely focus more on maximization of 
long-term profit and economic growth.  This means that the stability of a political regime 
matters in the context of the efficiency of state ownership. With respect to the Singaporean 
experience, Shih argues that “[t]he long time horizon and unchallenged political 
dominance afford Singaporean rulers the luxury of focusing on long-term returns on their 
investment because they can expect to reap the bulk of the benefits.” See Victor Shih, 
Tools of Survival: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Singapore and China, 14 GEOPOLITICS 328, 
332 (2009).  In this regard, Kazakhstan mirrors Singapore to a large extent because of the 
highly influential role of the country’s leader, his family, and close allies.
151. In particular, the course of the state sector’s total replacement initially applied by 
the Kazakhstani political leadership led to extreme social insecurity among a large part of 
the population that could not adjust to newly established market conditions and lost their 
confidence in the pension system.  As a result, the Kazakhstani authorities sought to 
transfer responsibility for social insurance and pension payments to the private sector. 
Reforming Kazakhstan’s Pension System: Social Protection Project Briefs, ASIAN DEV.
BANK (Oct. 2009), https://www.adb.org/publications/reforming-kazakhstans-pension-
system [https://perma.cc/QPE3-7PZY].  Consequently, for a long period of time, the state 
sector’s guarantees were limited and lots of enterprises did not demonstrate prudency in 
their contribution to the pension fund.  Id. Recently, this situation resulted in the 
nationalization of the pension system in Kazakhstan.  Sania Baikenova, Modernization 
Involves Reliability, ZAKON (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.zakon.kz/4590020-chto-takoe-
enpf-i-chem-objasnjaetsja.html [https://perma.cc/PZT2-XWP9].
152. Id.
153. Scholars emphasize the existing tension between two models as well as tensions 
“between the economic and political systems.” Jiang Hua et al., Empirical Taxonomy of 
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A political component is considered as one of the major sources of costs 
in SOEs.154 In particular, current or former government officials constitute 
the majority of corporate directors in Samruk-Kazyna and SOEs in 
Kazakhstan.155 Kazakhstani policymakers consider this board composition 
as taking advantage of the solid work experience of government officials.
Notwithstanding the fact that many of these government officials have 
important managerial skills and a deep knowledge of particular industries that 
may be beneficial for the SOEs they manage, their appointments raise a huge 
concern that some of the commercial interests of SOEs can be sacrificed to 
the political or career considerations of bureaucrats, considering some major 
corporate decisions are subject to bargaining between “the bureaucracies of 
the central ministries in charge of big state firms.”156 The institutional context 
of Kazakhstan casts significant doubt on whether the government has fully 
separated its function as both a regulator and as a shareholder.157  SOE 
managers and government officials routinely circulate within a revolving 
door system of state governance and SOE leadership.158 This dynamic 
reinforces a cozy relationship amongst the incumbent SOE management, the 
government, and the political leadership.159 Political considerations trigger 
the incentive problem and the lack of managerial autonomy.  The opaque 
process of management appointments and remuneration, as well as the 
affiliation of the SOE managers with the political leadership, undermines the 
SOEs’ independence from political influence in decision-making.  The lack 
of transparency in SOE management and operations brings about the case 
when SOE managers are appointed based on their adherence to the political 
system and not their professional knowledge and experience.  The
appointment to SOE management of political populists—who do not have 
solid experience in a particular industry, but instead make advances to the 
political leadership with the goal of achieving short-term political gains for 
themselves—is the potential cause of poor management and the creation of 
misleading policies.
Notwithstanding that some of the SOEs are among the largest corporate 
entities in their industries, their position is often attributed to extensive state 
support, and not necessarily their efficiency.  As one scholar puts it, there are 
“concerted bureaucratic efforts” to make SOEs strong but “they are not as 
SOE Governance in Transitional China, 10 J. MGMT. GOVERNANCE 401, 402 (2006).
154. Su & He, supra note 57, at 307.  Dongwei Su provides evidence that corporate 
boards in China’s publicly-listed firms are largely selected through political and 
administrative processes rather than endogenously chosen in competitive managerial labor 
markets, and hence are less likely to monitor management.  Su, supra note 57, at 119.
155. See Michael Mesquita, Kazakhstan’s Presidential Transition and the Evolution of 
Elite Networks, 24 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 371, 378–79 (2016).
156. See Choon-Yin Sam, Partial Privatisation and the Role of State Owned Holding 
Companies in China, 17 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 767, 776–77 (2013).
157. See Margaret M. Pearson, The Business of Governing Business in China: 
Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State, 57 WORLD POLITICS 296, 298, 
307 (2005).
158. Id. at 307.
159. Id.
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competitive i.e. market performing, as we would like them to be.”160  SOEs 
in Kazakhstan are subject to soft budget constraints.161 This means that SOEs 
can secure additional finances to be rescued from bankruptcy, should they 
incur losses.  Thus, the possibility of the bailout for SOEs can cause moral 
hazards.162
Furthermore, it is possible that the market will become too dependent on 
the state policies of financing and subsidizing.  In other words, private 
companies will not be able to solve their financial problems without state 
support, and the market will shrink with the termination of government 
programs.  In addition, SOEs and quasi-state entities that benefit from 
privileged positions in terms of state funding may crowd out less sustainable 
private companies, which in turn will reduce economic diversification and 
competition—leading to an even more monopolistic market.  For example, 
one of the negative consequences of the recently increased role of the 
Kazakhstani government in the economy is the possible decline of non-
governmental entrepreneurial initiatives.163 In particular, the essence of 
relationships in the state and quasi-state sectors do not create equal conditions 
for all actors and for private businesses.164 This may cause a situation where 
entrepreneurs are not able to compete with their state counterparts and prefer 
to leave the market, or choose to free ride when the state bears large expenses.
Finally, multitasking creates a challenge for SOEs because they have to 
comply with different priorities stated in state strategic programs while 
finding a compromise between state and corporate interests.  This 
compromise is typically at the costs of SOE profitability.  SOEs have to 
follow many policy documents and comply with multiple government-
determined indicators.165 This obligation generates a wide range of tasks, 
duplication of functions, and poor economic planning.  Many SOEs in 
Kazakhstan deal with numerous, often conflicting, agendas.166 On the one 
hand, they are positioned as private companies seeking profit maximization.  
On the other hand, they have to fulfill socio-economic—typically non-
profit—objectives.  For instance, when implementing its investment policy, 
the Fund considers often-contradictory indicators such as profitability, on the 
one hand, and investments for the country’s future development, on the other.
As a consequence, state industrialization and economic diversification 
160. See Hon. S. Chan, Politics Over Markets: Integrating State-Owned Enterprises 
Into Chinese Socialist Market, 29 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 43, 52–53 (2009).
161. See Yelena Kalyuzhnova & Christian Nygaard, State Governance Evolution in 
Resource-Rich Transition Economies: an Application to Russia and Kazakhstan, 36 
ENERGY POL’Y 1829, 1832–33 (2008).
162. HA-JOON CHANG, U.N., DEPT. OF SOC. & ECON. AFF., NAT’L DEV. STRATEGIES,
POLICY NOTES: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM 13 (2007).
163. See Asilbek, supra note 73.
164. Pearson, supra note 157, at 301.
165. See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP [WBG], CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES: A TOOLKIT 112 (2014).
166. Id. at 15.
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programs have barely achieved their objectives.167 Still, the Fund invests 
heavily in commodity industries.168 In 2010, these investments amounted to 
43% of total investments by the Fund.169  Transportation and infrastructure, 
as well as energy, were the second and third industries the Fund invested in 
at 30% and 8%, respectively.170 The commodity companies continue to be 
the most profitable among the SOEs.171 In 2011, the national oil company, 
KazMunaiGas, generated the highest net profit in the Group—more than $3.2 
billion (486 billion tenge)—which is approximately four times higher than 
the second most profitable SOE company, the national railroad monopoly,
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy.172
Nonetheless, until recently the system of SOEs functioning in 
Kazakhstan has been apparently less expensive than expected and has 
provided the national economy with benefits that seem to outweigh its 
costs.173  This system broadens the conceptual and empirical boundaries 
between the state and the market, while exhibiting many quasi-public, quasi-
private features.174 Therefore, Kazakhstan does not fall neatly into either the 
free-market category or the planned-market category.  Its economy has relied 
on markets and competition while retaining the power of the state in setting 
the course of economic development.175 SOE efficiency in Kazakhstan is 
based largely on the tradeoff between costs and benefits of state ownership.  
These costs and benefits result from the institutional conditions existing in 
Kazakhstan, particularly the lack of well-developed institutions.  Still, the 
government, as a controlling shareholder, assumes current failures and losses 
in profit from SOEs.  Policymakers prefer to focus on long-term agendas of 
diversification and social stability.  In this context, the government considers 
the benefits of SOEs and measures their value not from the position of their 
short-term profitability but rather from the perspective of public goods, 
167. See Instituty Razvitia Kazakhstana: A Effectivnost v Chem? [Kazakhstan 
Institutions of Development], CARAVAN, Mar. 5, 2010, at 2, https://www.caravan.kz/
articles/instituty-razvitiya-kazakhstana-a-ehffektivnost-v-chem-373623/ [https://
perma.cc/P4C2-8A7J].
168. Even with state investments in innovative development, it is difficult to figure out 
what works best for Kazakhstan.  In particular, Kanat Berentayev, the Deputy Director of 
the Public Policy Research Center, claims that most innovative development programs 
focus on technologies (e.g., nanotechnology, biofuels, etc.) that the Kazakhstani economy 
cannot currently take advantage of.  Id. at 2–3.
169. See generally SAMRUK-KAZYNA, SWF 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 139.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. SAMRUK-KAZYNA, SWF 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 493.
173. “[T]he existence of transaction costs means that it is often much less costly to set 
up an SOE and deal with unexpected contingencies through internal government directives 
than to set up some contract-based regime – regulation and/or taxes/subsidies – to address 
such concerns.” CHANG, supra note 162.
174. Francis, supra note 46, at 280.
175. 6HH2EXWYHU]KGHQLL*RVXGDUVWYHQQRƱSURJUDPP\LQGXVWULDOүQR-innovaWִ sionnogo 
razvitLִ ia Respubliki Kazaɯstan na 2015–2019 [On Approval of the State Program of 
Industrial-Innovative Development of Kazakhstan for 2015–2019], KAZAKHSTANSKAYA 
PRAVDA, Aug. 1, 2014, No. 874, at 121.
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including socio-economic benefits, subsidies, dividends and tax revenues 
generated by SOEs, as well as their long-term investment activities.176
Conclusion
Despite the corporatization management reforms of state entities in 
Kazakhstan, there is much work to be done to make the economy resilient to 
external shocks, to ensure the sustainability of the entities’ growth, and to 
translate this growth into corresponding improvements in the economic 
welfare of the state’s citizens.  To establish clear objectives, develop 
workable check-up mechanisms, and ensure proper coordination among 
multiple agendas of SOEs, governments in transition economies, including 
Kazakhstan, should consider the following policy priorities.
First, state policies need to be coordinated, simplified, and closely 
monitored. The number of strategic documents and reports must be 
downsized to focus on the feasibility of the strategic goals for the country.177
Every strategic document for a state project should be result-oriented.  This 
means that the document should establish long-run comprehensible outcomes 
of the project.  In order to reach these outcomes, the document should provide 
a roadmap with the coherent criteria of success for every stage that 
corresponds with the long-run outcomes of the project.  Additionally, the state 
should define concrete quantitative and quality indicators to assess the 
achievement of short- and long-term outcomes.  Clear and concrete criteria 
and indicators would improve the quality of monitoring and assessment of the 
project’s results and would allow better tracing of the project’s progress.
Second, governments should consider an issue emphasized by 
international experts—the increase of disclosure. The incomplete 
information available on the actual total amount of state financing across 
different industries prevents an effective analysis of state industrial policies 
in Kazakhstan.  The available data is usually limited to a particular sector or 
176. In this regard, the State Accounting Committee responsible for state financial 
control assesses the SOE efficiency as full and effective budget spending in accordance 
with state strategic goals.  This means from a policy perspective, the SOEs’ efficiency 
implies (1) the achievement of outcomes outlined in the strategic documents of each SOE 
as well as state policy programs and (2) the full and effective use of state funds.  See ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV. [OECD], STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 34 (2015) (suggesting that successful SOEs have clearly spelled out objectives); 
2YQHVHQLLL]PHQHQLƱLGRSROQHQLƱYQHNRWRU\H]DNRQRGDWHOүQ\HDNW\5HVSXEOLNL.D]Dɯstan 
po usileniLִ u otvetstvennosti uchastnikov bLִ udzhetnogo proWִ VHVVDSROXFKDWHOHƱELִ udzhetnyɯ
sredstv i povysheniLִ XơIIHNWLYQRVWLELִ udzhetnyɯproWִ sedur [On Amendments and Additions 
Legislative acts of Kazakhstan on Strengthening Accountability of the Budget Process, 
Budget Beneficiaries, and Improve the Efficiency of Budgetary Procedures], ADILET, Feb. 
16, 2012, No. 557-IV LRK.
177. Another illustration of an overwhelming quantity of formal documents is the 
legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.  According to the statistics available at Adilet, 
an official information system of legal acts, 8,487 legal acts were approved in 2012, 7,131 
acts in 2013, and 9,887 in 2014.  ADILET, www.adilet.zan.kz [https://perma.cc/TA5B-
X6XM].  This dynamic variability of the law raises questions about its effectiveness, 
presenting a serious challenge to conducting business activities in the country.
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a group of investment projects.178 For instance, in Kazakhstan there is no 
information on the exact amount of budget funds allocated to all the sectors 
through different instruments, nor is there a comprehensive study of the 
efficiency of such budget spending.179 Despite a great number of state 
programs, strategies, and action plans issued by the Kazakhstani government, 
state agencies, and national companies on an annual basis, the data is typically 
limited to reporting on the implementation of these documents and putting 
the numbers on records, without adequately examining the outcomes of the 
entire system of state planning and spending.180 Therefore, with the exception 
of a few strategic state assets, the majority of SOEs can and should be fully 
transparent in terms of their investment strategy, portfolio allocation, risk 
management procedure, governance structure, and management reward 
system.  For transparency and accountability, an external monitoring 
mechanism involving parliament, academics, and private sector 
representatives should also be set up.181
Third, decision-making in SOEs should actually be independent from 
politics.182 Independent directors in corporate boards and supervisory 
committees may fulfill this function.183 To guarantee objectivity, the 
government should establish a sufficient system of solid regulation.  
Competent corporate directors and professional managers should be 
appointed in accordance with their skills and work experience rather than 
their political affiliation and personal connections.  From this viewpoint, the 
number of independent directors in corporate boards should be increased 
since management largely represented by government officials cannot be 
178. World Bank Group [WBG], Kazakhstan: Adjusting to Lower Oil Prices; 
Challenging Times Ahead Kazakhstan, at 7, (WBG Doc. 101506, Nov. 30, 2015).
179. See JANAR JANDOSOVA, INT’L BUDGET PARTNERSHIP, OPEN BUDGET SURVEY 2015:
KAZAKHSTAN 3 (2015) (reporting that Kazakhstan received a score of fifty-one out of a 
possible one hundred for budget transparency because it provides the public with limited 
information); 5HVSXEOLNDQVNLƱELִ udzhet [Republican Budget], ADILET, Apr. 1, 2016, No. 
13701.
180. See SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND SAMRUK-KAZYNA JOINT STOCK CO., SAMRUK-
KAZYNA, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2015, at 52 (2015).
181. FELIPE & RHEE, supra note 61, at 56.
182. When asked to explain why the government had not intervened in the Temasek–
Shin Corporation deal in 2006, the Minister for Finance Tharman Shanmugaratnam 
told Members of Parliament that the government had not meddled with the Shin 
Corp-Temasek deal because it was not the government’s job to do so.  Temasek’s
board, which the government helps to appoint, has the discretion to decide how the 
investment arm’s resources are allocated, which as Temasek’s CEO Ho Ching 
explained, is strictly based on returns.  
Choon-Yin Sam, Partial Privatisation and the Role of State Owned Holding Companies 
in China, 17 J. MGNT & GOVERNANCE 767, 782 (2013).
183. The experience of SOEs around the globe demonstrates that issues such as the 
free-riding problem and the soft budget constraints inherent in SOEs can be mitigated 
through independent and professional management.  FELIPE & RHEE, supra note 61, at 56.  
Indeed, there are many examples of SOEs in countries such as Singapore, France, Finland, 
Norway, and Taiwan that are not just efficient in a narrow sense but also lead their 
country’s economic growth through technological dynamism and export successes.  See
Su & He, supra note 57, at 306.
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fully objective.184 This means a qualitative expansion of the list of persons 
who will take over SOEs.  In addition, state authorities should incentivize 
SOE managers through highly attractive personal benefits if SOE managers 
attain higher productivity of state assets.
Fourth, the government must clearly define the non-profit objectives of 
SOEs with their subsequent approval by corporate boards.  These objectives 
should be defined for a concrete period and/or a project in order to improve 
the efficiency of SOE economic planning.  Good planning leads to better 
governance and higher profitability of SOEs, which, in turn, increases the 
revenue for the state budget.
Finally, industrial and financial policy programs need financial 
participation of private actors, domestic and foreign, in order to share risks 
between the state and private sectors.  Even though existing policy documents 
in Kazakhstan establish the opportunity for private firms to invest in 
industrial and innovation projects, the role of the private sector needs to be 
expanded.  Moreover, foreign private investors should get the same level of 
access that domestic investors do to the projects and information.  In this 
regard, the governments must expand the list of approachable capital sources 
available for the private sector, along with state financing and bank loans.  
Hence, further development of capital markets becomes essential.  Market 
conditions offered should at least be as favorable as bank financing.  This 
means that the government in Kazakhstan should create a fair and competitive 
market environment for all actors.
In conclusion, institutional shifts are never simple, and the final results 
of any transition remains unknown. On the current stage of institutional 
formation, the government in Kazakhstan took the lead of economic 
development, blurring the line between public and private.  However, as long 
as the market develops and integrates with the international market, capital 
will be allocated among companies depending on their market advantages and 
performance.  This means that SOEs will have to equally compete with their 
private counterparts in the market, which, in turn, will call for further 
modernization of the state sector, as well as for the reduction of the number 
of SOEs in order to decrease transaction costs.  At the same time, for such 
transition economies as Kazakhstan, the process of transition does not mean 
the evolution from state ownership to purely private markets.  Instead, this 
184. For example, in his testimony before the House of Financial Services Committee 
in the United States on March 5, 2008, Simon Claude Israel, who was then Executive 
Director and Member of the Board of Temasek, told the U.S. audience that the professional 
management team at Temasek comprised 40% of non-Singaporeans at the team’s senior 
level.  Sam, supra note 182, at 783. This can be seen as an attempt to profile Temasek as 
a commercial entity on the basis that it is less likely for non-Singaporeans to serve 
Singapore’s political interest in the hope of moving up the state hierarchy, particularly 
after the government has publicly pronounced the commercial orientation of Temasek.  In 
a similar vein, Temasek appointed eleven individuals with diverse management 
backgrounds and industrial experience from the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, 
China, and India to sit on the International Panel.  Id.  The fact that there are non-
Singaporeans who provide advice on the allocation of Singapore’s resources supports the 
government’s claim that Temasek is commercially and independently run.  See id.
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process can introduce alternative approaches to transition, where SOEs 
perform an active role in capitalizing national economies, sustaining 
economic growth, and allocating wealth.
